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Abstract
The so-called German Dominance Hypothesis (GDH) claimed that Bundes-
bank policies were transmitted into other European Monetary System (EMS)
interest rates during the pre-euro era. We reformulate this hypothesis for the
Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries that are on the verge of ac-
cessing the eurozone. We test this “Euro Dominance Hypothesis (EDH)” in a
novel way using a global vector autoregressive (GVAR) approach that combines
country-specific error correction models in a global system. We find that euro
area monetary policies are transmitted into CEE interest rates which provides
evidence for monetary integration between the eurozone and CEE countries.
Our framework also allows for introducing global monetary shocks to provide
empirical evidence regarding the effects of the recent financial crisis on monetary
integration in Europe.
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1 Introduction
Long before the introduction of a single European currency, the notion of potential
asymmetries within the European Monetary System (EMS) startled a debate both
between academics and central bankers. The claim was that other members’ cen-
tral banks surrendered their monetary sovereignty to the German Bundesbank by
mimicking German monetary policies with an eye towards keeping their domestic
currency values stable vis-a`-vis the Deutschmark (DM).
This so-called “German Dominance Hypothesis” (henceforth GDH) received con-
siderable attention in the empirical exchange rate literature. Although theory would
support the idea of an asymmetric monetary system (Barro and Gordon (1983);
Giavazzi and Pagano (1988)), conclusive and robust empirical evidence is rather
scant. The econometric approach was typically based on short-run nominal money
market rates and identified asymmetries in the EMS in terms of Granger causality.
The monetary system was considered asymmetric in the strict sense if there was
evidence for unidirectional causality from Germany to the other EMS members (Uc-
tum, 1999). Several authors (Katsimbris and Miller (1993); Hassapis et al. (1999))
added an extra-European dimension and tested how monetary innovations from the
rest of the world (ROW), proxied by the US, were transmitted into the EMS. Inter-
national asymmetry in this broader sense implied that the ROW only affected the
other EMS countries through its impact on German money market rates. German
Dominance would then only be fulfilled if both forms of asymmetry could not be
rejected simultaneously.
German monetary leadership in the EMS has been investigated empirically by
a number of authors. Fratianni and von Hagen (1990), von Hagen and Fratianni
(1990) and de Grauwe (1989) find no statistical evidence for the notion of German
Dominance (at least not in the strong form of unidirectional causality). Their results
rather support the idea of multidirectional linkages within the EMS, attributing the
Bundesbank an important, yet not dominant role. Karfakis and Moschos (1990), on
the other hand, fail to reject the GDH.1 They conclude that German interest rates
Granger-cause other EMS members’ rates in a bivariate setup.
We believe, however, that previous empirical results on the GDH should be
taken with a grain of salt due to several limitations in the econometric methodol-
ogy employed at that time. In particular, the notion of cointegration was not well
established and often not tested for at all. Commonly used vector autoregressive
(VAR) specifications in first differences are hence likely to yield biased estimates.
Also, Granger causality tests suffer from a timing problem since they are unable to
distinguish between the short and the long run.
These issues are addressed properly by Kirchga¨ssner and Wolters (1993). They
formulate and test the GDH in a multivariate cointegration framework and find
evidence for German Dominance by imposing appropriate restrictions on loading co-
1Giavazzi and Giovanni (1987) and MacDonald and Taylor (1991) are amongst others to support
the idea of German Dominance as well.
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efficients and the cointegrating vector. The debate back then was essentially framed
in terms of the loss of monetary independence (a cost). The alternative notion of
convergence seems more appropriate for today’s enlarging eurozone. Similar tests
of interest rate linkages have to our knowledge not yet been conducted for the euro
area vis-a`-vis other European Union (EU) members that have the ambition to join.2
The institutional environment has changed rather importantly with the creation
of a European Economic Monetary Union (EMU) and the creation of the European
Central Bank (ECB). Whereas the empirical evidence on German Dominance in the
pre-euro era (and the loss of monetary autonomy of national central banks to the
Bundesbank) remains a matter of debate, the ECB nowadays acts as the single legal
body that is responsible for conducting monetary policy for the whole euro area.
The monetary system is hence by definition symmetric upon making abstraction of
governance issues within the ECB. The question of greater cooperation of national
central banks as opposed to following a hegemonic player no longer applies in the
absence of the “N − 1 problem”.3 For countries outside EMU, however, potential
ECB leadership may be desirable from a convergence perspective but may equally
be problematic in the face of domestic or global shocks over a shorter horizon. This
also raises the question of the transmission of EMU shocks to those countries.
The main contribution of this paper consists in reformulating the GDH in terms
of the current eurozone and non-eurozone countries that are on the brink of acces-
sion; that is, we introduce the so-called Euro Dominance Hypothesis (henceforth
EDH). Our monetary convergence analysis focuses on the transitional economies
from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) for several reasons. First, the process of
European integration received a fresh impetus with the EU eastern enlargement.
This, in turn, revitalised research into issues such as the endogeneity of optimum
currency areas, the potentially increasing heterogeneity in monetary policy transmis-
sion channels, the impact on movements of goods, capital and labour across borders,
etc.4 Second, unlike countries such as the United Kingdom or Denmark, the Treaty
on European Community requires newly joining EU member states to eventually
introduce the euro.5 European monetary integration is therefore defined within the
context of this paper as a process of interest rate convergence with the eurozone
that culminates into the introduction of the euro as single currency. This implies
that national central banks irrevocably fix their national currencies with the euro
at some predetermined rate and hand over their monetary autonomy to the ECB.
Although national central banks can still influence the decision-making within the
2Feridun (2006) extends the geographic scope of the GDH by testing for linkages between the
Czech Republic and Slovakia vis-a`-vis Germany from 1991 to 2004. However, the problem with this
analysis is that the Bundesbank has no longer been in charge of conducting independent monetary
policy since 1999.
3See Fratianni and von Hagen (1992) for a lucid discussion of the cooperative versus the disci-
plinary interpretation of the EMS.
4See for instance Angeloni et al. (2005) or de Grauwe and Me´litz (2005) for a further discussion.
5From the original ten CEE member countries only Slovenia (in 2007) and Slovakia (in 2009)
so far have met the Maastricht convergence criteria which allowed them to join the eurozone. The
CEE countries which yet need to become part of the euro area are in alphabetical order: Bulgaria,
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania.
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ECB, conducting independent monetary policies to stabilise the domestic economy
is no longer possible.
The current situation of CEE countries outside the eurozone trying to bring
their domestic monetary policy and currencies more in line with the ECB policies
bears similarities with the EMS situation. In the 80’s and 90’s the DM and the
Bundesbank were considered the major currency and the “leading” central bank
within the EMS. The DM was widely used outside Germany, particularly in CEE
countries. About 30-40% of the currency in circulation was held abroad according
to a Bundesbank study (Seitz, 1995). A similar degree of currency substitution
for the euro can also be identified in some CEE economies (Dvorsky et al., 2008).
Both ECB and Bundesbank moreover share a similar constitution. The GDH was
generally motivated by the credible low-inflation path of the Bundesbank. Given
these historial and institutional similarities, it seems natural to consider the euro
and the ECB as a continuation of the DM and the Bundesbank, respectively, and to
upgrade models developed for the analysis of the EMS to today’s environment.
Our testing framework not only offers an upgrade in the institutional dimension
but also on the methodological level. While reduced from specifications such as the
vector error correction model (VECM) employed by Kirchga¨ssner and Wolters (1993)
may be considered theory-averse, large-scale macroeconometric models are by their
very nature computationally intense and are thus typically only developed by major
policy institutions. We test for monetary convergence between EMU and non-EMU
countries using a rather novel global vector-error correcting modelling approach due
to Pesaran et al. (2004) and furthered by Dees et al. (2007).
Global VAR (GVAR) modelling may be considered an attempt to unite more
data-driven European approaches with the more theory-driven American take on
econometrics.6 In contrast to cointegrated systems as advanced most notably by
Johansen (1995), some variables are treated as structurally exogenous based on the-
oretical considerations. This procedure allows for richer dynamic specifications and
a more efficient analysis of macroeconomic data, particularly for relatively short time
periods (Pesaran et al., 2000).
The GVAR approach seems to be particularly suitable for the case of small open
economies, where it is plausible to assume that variables such as foreign prices are
exogenous. Loosely speaking, variables are considered weakly exogenous in this con-
text if they only affect domestic variables contemporaneously but are not affected by
domestic deviations from the long-run equilibrium. Granger and Lin (1995) refer to
weakly exogenous variables as “long-run forcing” in the presence of cointegration and
as such this notion is very much different from “Granger causality” which commonly
framed the empirical investigation of the GDH.
While the GDH suggests that the Bundesbank dictated monetary policies in the
EMS, our idea of the EDH implies that the ECB now takes up a similar role in
the enlarging E(M)U. The GVAR approach allows for a coherent formulation of the
EDH. It fully exploits the information set and at the same time reflects the structural
6Also see Hoover et al. (2008) and the references therein for a discussion on this controversy.
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underpinnings of monetary integration in Europe. It will be interesting to see to what
extent the EDH testing results are sensitive to the prevailing exchange rate regime
in the CEE countries. The main goal of this article is to investigate whether the
EDH not only applies to countries such as Bulgaria, Estonia or Lithuania which have
adopted a unilateral currency board arrangement with the euro (CBA) but also to
explicit inflation targeters such as Poland.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses in more detail alternative
ways of formulating the EDH. We present the data and test the EDH in terms of
the preferred GVAR model in Section 3. Section 4 investigates how the findings on
Euro Dominance are affected by global shocks. Section 5 concludes.
2 Formulating the EDH
2.1 The EDH in terms of a VECM
In line with the state of econometric advancement at that time the conventional way
of investigating the GDH was by means of Granger causality tests, typically in bivari-
ate VAR systems in first differences. Kirchga¨ssner and Wolters (1993) were the first
to properly account for cointegration by formulating the GDH in terms of a VECM
which combines short-run deviations with long-run equilibrium co-movements in a
multivariate setting. We could follow their approach and write in the presence of
cointegration the reduced form VECM(p) of order p for the N countries as
∆Rt = Φdt +αβ′Rt−1 +
p−1∑
k=1
Πk∆Rt−k + εt, (1)
where εt is a N -dimensional zero mean white noise process with positive definite
covariance matrix and Φ includes deterministic terms such as dummies. Rt are
the domestic nominal interest rate series. The parameter matrices α and β are
of dimension (N × r) with r representing the number of cointegrating relations.
The VECM is a restricted VAR in that it adds the cointegration space Γ = αβ′
which identifies the long-term integration process: β quantifies the cointegrating
relations and α contains the loading coefficients which attach weights to the long-
run equilibrium relations. The short-run interest rate dynamics are described by
Π. The VECM is sometimes also referred to as Cointegrated VAR (CVAR) and
obviously nests the first-differenced VAR.
European monetary integration was earlier defined as a process that has both
short-term and long-term aspects. We assume for the remainder that all CEE coun-
tries have the intention to join EMU over the long run, given the absence of an
opt-out clause. One natural way to identify Euro Dominance is therefore to analyse
convergence in terms of Γ. The EDH may be thought of consisting of the following
hypotheses in reference to Kirchga¨ssner and Wolters (1993): CEE Dependence, Euro
Independence, CEE Insularity and Global Insularity – all of which could easily be
tested by imposing appropriate exclusion restrictions on α.
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The notion of CEE Dependence simply suggests cointegration between CEE
interest rates and euro rates, whereas Euro Independence implies weak exogeneity
of the euro area with respect to CEE countries. We could not reject the EDH in its
strong form if we found evidence for the first two conditions which would identify
euro rates as the common stochastic trend. The notion of CEE Insularity is meant
to enrich the argument by allowing for feedback relations in a multivariate context.
The other insularity condition lifts the EDH on a global level, thereby accounting
for the increasing interlinkages across countries and allowing for feedback with the
ROW.
While the VECM approach allowed us to formulate the EDH in a consistent
manner, economically meaningful normalisations of the cointegrating vector would
crucially hinge on the existence of a common stochastic trend. Cointegration tests
for large N but relatively short time dimension may be prone to size distortions,
however. The most natural way of dealing with this “curse of dimensionality” seems
to be to first investigate interest rate linkages on a domestic level, before analysing
all series in a combined system. This is the essence of GVAR modelling we discuss
next.
2.2 The EDH in terms of a GVAR
Our proposed approach in formulating and testing the EDH is mainly empirical
in nature but it also has some structural underpinnings. Suppose there are two
blocs of countries (CEE and EMU) and both blocs have their own independent
central banks. EMU is a large economy and follows a common monetary policy,
whereas CEE consists of several more disjoint small open economies. Monetary
policy makers in CEE are as a consequence somewhat more heterogeneous in their
choice of operating procedures but share a common overall objective of ultimately
becoming part of EMU .
We may conceptualise the situation in CEE by means of the following policy
rule:
Rit = G(L)zt,
where Rit represents the vector of policy instruments in a particular CEE country
(typically short-term interest rates or foreign reserves), G(L) is a vector polynomial
in the lag operator L and zt contains policy-relevant endogenous and exogenous vari-
ables, including short-term interest rates in EMU .7 Specifying some sort of reaction
function, however, might not only be limited by data availability and reliability but
would also lead us to exclusively centre the analysis around short-run central bank
behaviour. Our proposed error-correcting specification is richer: It captures short-
run deviations but models interest rate convergence in particular under a long-run
equilibrium perspective.
7Obviously, if euro area interest rates would not matter to the policy rule in CEE the corre-
sponding parameter value gi in the parameter vector g was just zero. Other variables which may
be part of zt are output gaps or exchange rate differentials between the two blocs.
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The Maastricht criteria of stable nominal exchange rates but at the same time
low and stable inflation rates describe the relevant benchmarks for monetary con-
vergence. CEE central banks have moved towards the extremes of possible exchange
rate arrangements over the last decade. The Bank of Latvia for example recently
pegged the lat tightly with the euro, only allowing for much smaller fluctuations than
stipulated in the Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM II) which essentially replaced
the former EMS. Other national central banks announce explicit inflation targets
and allow their exchange rates to float freely. Table 1 gives an overview of the pre-
vailing monetary policy regime as of the end of 2009. The stabilising effects on the
exchange rate from inflation targeting or active exchange rate fixing are apparent
from market data.8 This seems to suggest that the exchange rate arrangement in
itself is not decisive for successful EMU entry, although there is some evidence that
greater flexibility facilitates compliance with the Maastricht criteria (Lewis, 2009).
Table 1: Overview of monetary policy frameworks in CEE
monetary policy framework
Bulgaria CBA
Czech Rep. floating; inflation targeting
Estonia CBA; ERM II
Hungary floating; inflation targeting
Latvia hard peg; ERM II
Lithuania CBA; ERM II
Poland floating; inflation targeting
Romania floating; inflation targeting
Sources: Public information by the ECB and national central banks in CEE
CBA stands for unilateral currency board arrangement with the euro; ERM II indicates
membership in the Exchange Rate Mechanism II
The GVAR approach allows for considering various real and nominal variables at
a time. In line with the structural underpinnings and reported descriptive evidence
we resist the temptation of extending the analysis further and confine ourselves to
short-term nominal interest rates. This not only allows for a more transparent map-
ping to the VECM (a crucial methodological contribution of our paper) but those
also seem to be the most reliable measure of monetary convergence for the enlarg-
ing euro area. Coricelli et al. (2006) study the transmission of monetary policies in
CEE countries and find empirical evidence for a complete passthrough from domes-
tic monetary policy key rates to short-term money market rates. The CEE banking
industry has undergone substantial reforms towards market-based structures during
the 90’s. In contrast to bond, equity and derivative markets, the financial sector cur-
rently matches EMU standards and can no longer be considered “underdeveloped”.9
Previously state-owned banks were privatised to establish a so-called two-tier bank-
8See figure A.1. A notable exception may be the Hungarian forint which has been subject to
speculative attacks lately.
9See Schadler et al. (2005) for more detailed evidence.
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ing system consisting of an independent central bank and several private commercial
banks. The process of market liberalisation led to the removal of interest rate ceilings
on credits and lowered entry barriers for private domestic and foreign banks. Ac-
counting standards, commercial and bankruptcy law as well as banking supervisory
and regulatory procedures were put in place to meet the changed market structures
(Dickinson and Mullineux, 2001).
Given the state of development of the financial sector in CEE, convergence of
monetary policies may therefore be best identified on money markets. If national
central banks outside the eurozone mimicked the ECB’s path, it may be conjec-
tured that this is reflected in the CEE domestic money markets, i.e. CEE and EMU
interbank rates are expected to be cointegrated. GVAR modellling (Pesaran et al.
(2004), Dees et al. (2007)) tests for cointegration first in country-specific systems be-
fore combining all error-correcting terms in a global model. One may thus view the
proposed framework as an attempt to consolidate the different approaches used dur-
ing EMS times to examine the GDH. This two-stage approach offers an alternative,
more structural, way of investigating the EDH.
A crucial difference between the VECM and the GVAR related to these struc-
tural underpinnings lies in the way weak exogeneity is introduced. Whereas in the
VECM weak exogeneity is tested for by imposing exclusion restrictions on estimated
parameters, particular variables in the GVAR specification (typically foreign quan-
tities) are treated as weakly exogenous from the outset. We could, of course, also
condition on weakly exogenous variables in the VECM. As we shall see below, how-
ever, the GVAR allows for a coherent analysis of impulse responses within a global
system and thus accounts for the interlinkages across the partial models.
Each country-specific error-correcting model contains both domestic and foreign
variables. The latter ones are treated as long-run forcing in the sense of Granger
and Lin (1995) without necessarily ruling out short-run feedback from the lagged
variables. We conjecture euro rates to be (weakly) exogenous to CEE countries.
We also introduce global influences, proxied by US interest rates. We have N = 10
countries, where EMU is the reference country. We therefore denote euro rates by
R0t and dollar rates by R∗t . We index CEE rates by i = 1, . . . , n with n = 8.
We model the EDH in terms of the GVAR as follows. We introduce two sets of
V ARX∗(pi, qi) models for each country bloc, CEE and EMU, where pi and qi refer
to the lag order of the domestic and the foreign rates, respectively. The CEE-system
looks as follows
Θi(L, pi)Rit = ai0 + Λi(L, qi)R0t + εit (2)
and for EMU we have
Θ0(L, pi)R0t = a0 + Λ0(L, qi)R∗t + ε0t. (3)
All idiosyncratic shocks εt are assumed to be i.i.d. Note that (2) and (3) are simply
reduced form VAR models augmented by (weakly) exogenous foreign variables which
nest standard unrestricted VAR processes if Λ(L, qi) = 0. The CEE model suggests
that CEE countries are small open economies which take interest rates in the large
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economy EMU as exogenously given. US interest rates affect CEE markets indi-
rectly via EMU rates. US interest rates are thus treated under the null as globally
exogenous to reflect the idea of the US being a proxy for the ROW.
The EDH can now be stated as a joint hypothesis consisting of three legs:
• (I) CEE Dependence:
There is evidence for cointegration between Ri and R0.
• (II) Euro Independence:
R0 is indeed weakly exogenous to Ri.
• (III) Global Independence:
R∗ is weakly exogenous to R0.
Our definition of the EDH implies several adjustments compared to the original
GDH specification. In particular, we no longer conjecture any form of “insularity”
which seems to be an awkward notion, given the size of the CEE countries and the
degree of cooperation and coordination within the EU.10 The way we formulate the
EDH rather reflects two developments the EU faces: globalisation and integration.
Globalisation particularly refers to linkages outside Europe with the ROW as cap-
tured by condition (III). Integration is more related to inner-European issues, most
notably the eastern enlargement of E(M)U which conditions (I) and (II) examine.
In a later step, in section 4, we shall elaborate on the idea of globalisation and the
impacts on the EU and link (2) with (3).
3 Testing for Euro Dominance
3.1 Data
Our study is based on 3-month interbank rates obtained from Eurostat. Since
Bernanke and Blinder (1992)’s seminal paper short-term money market rates have
become the commonly accepted proxy for modelling monetary policy behaviour and
transmission in many economies. Given our focus on long-term aspects of monetary
convergence and given the noise and jumps present in daily interest rate movements,
we opted for a monthly frequency. The dataset ranges from January 2000 to August
2009. Accession negotiations with the CEE countries started already in the late
90’s such that market expectations and interest differentials in line with the idea
of uncovered interest rate parity are likely to reflect any signs of convergence early
on.11
10Also see Kadow (2007) who finds evidence for multilateral links (network effects) both between
CEE countries and with the eurozone using a multivariate cointegration approach.
11Ideally one would like to initiate the data in 1999. We refrained from doing so due to a
considerable amount of missing values for some countries in that period.
Does the euro dominate Central and Eastern European money markets? Page 10
Figure 1 shows the CEE money market series in levels. Money market rates for
the eurozone and the US are added for completeness and for sake of comparison.
The figure seems to suggest that short-term interest rates are converging indeed.12
All interbank rates display a sharp increase towards the end of 2008 which perfectly
coincides with the credit crunch. Interestingly, past CEE interest rate fluctuations
have often been much more severe than these end-of-sample spikes. Romania or
Poland, for example, experienced interbank rates that were up to 10 times higher
than their end-of-sample values.
Figure 1: Monthly observations of 3-month money market rates
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Figure 1 is clearly suggestive of a converging pattern. Graphs, however, can be
misleading and a formal analysis is called for. Our proposed framework obviously
requires variables to be integrated of order 1, I(1), even though the GVAR approach
is flexible enough to accommodate stationarity. We employ the standard augmented
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) regressions to test for the presence of unit roots in the series:
∆Rt = µ+ γRt−1 +
p∑
k=1
δk∆Rt−1 + εt.
12We also report the individual series in figure A.2 and in differenced form in figure A.3 to account
for the substantial initial spread between some CEE interest rates and euro rates.
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On the basis of the graphical analysis we decided not to include deterministic trends
in the Dickey-Fuller regressions. As usual, we test the null hypothesis of a unit
root, H0 : γ = 0, against the alternative that the time series is stationary, or I(0),
H1 : γ < 0. We conducted the tests at different levels of augmentation, up to a
quarter. The lag length was chosen using the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC).
Results are reported in table B.1 and suggest that all series are I(1) at the 5%
significance level.
3.2 Empirical results
Having established that the cointegrating framework is sensible we proceed with
testing the EDH. We first specify the lag structures of (2) and (3). Table 2 reports
the lag order of the individual country models. The length selection is performed
using the AIC which suggests that a V ARX∗(2, 1) suffices for most CEE country
models.13 Subject to residual-based specification tests we decided to treat EMU and
the US symmetrically with pi = qi = 2.
Table 2: V ARX∗(pi, qi) order based on AIC.
Country pi qi
Bulgaria 1 1
Czech Rep. 1 1
Estonia 2 1
Hungary 2 1
Latvia 2 1
Lithuania 2 1
Poland 1 1
Romania 2 1
euro area 2 2
Stacking endogenous and exogenous variables in zt and after some reparameter-
isations we obtain the V ECMX∗(pi − 1, qi − 1):
∆Rit = ci0 + αiβ′izi,t−1 +
p−1∑
k=1
Ψk∆zi,t−k +
q−1∑
k=1
Λk∆R˜i,t−k + εit, (4)
where R˜i refers to euro rates in case of i = 1, . . . , 8 and to dollar rates for i = 0.
The EDH can now be tested using (4) in two steps. We start by examining the
cointegration properties of the individual country models, followed by an assessment
of the weak exogeneity assumption. The country-specific cointegration rank ri is
determined using Johansen’s trace statistic. We follow Pesaran et al. (2000)’s testing
13By conditioning on weakly exogenous variables we obtain a richer dynamic structure than in
VAR models of the same order which would first need to be rewritten in univariate autoregressive
(integrated) moving average (AR(I)MA) representations for comparability (Pesaran et al., 2004).
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procedure and restrict the intercept to the cointegrating relations, hereby ruling out
linear trends in the data. Critical values are simulated based on 10,000 replications.
Detailed cointegration test results can be found in table B.2. Euro and dollar
rates cointegrate but there is also strong evidence for cointegration between CEE
rates and EMU. Evidence for Bulgaria is slightly weaker but still well within the 10%
level. We failed to establish cointegration between Hungarian and EMU interbank
rates. This finding may well be a result of the recent economic turmoil in Hugary as
the national central bank had to deal with speculative attacks on the forint. While
we may find evidence for Euro Dominance in Hungary in a different information set,
we conclude that the EDH is not supported by Hungarian money market rates.14
To test for Euro and Global Independence (conditions (II) and (III)) we as-
sess the pivotal weak exogeneity assumption which in econometric terms may be
considered a test for misspecification. We test for the significance of the estimated
error-correcting term, ECTi,t−1, in the marginal model for R˜it following Dees et al.
(2007). For example, to test for weak exogeneity of EMU interest rates in the Bul-
garian country model (i = 1) we need to evaluate the null hypothesis that γ1 = 0 in
the auxiliary regression:
∆R0t = µ1 + γ1ECT1,t−1 +
s1∑
k=1
δ1,k∆R1,t−k +
n1∑
m=1
ϕ0,m∆R0,t−m + ε1,t,
where we maintain the lag order of the underlying V ARX∗ by setting s1 = p1 and
n1 = q1. Results of this standard t-test are provided in table B.3 and support the
notion of weak exogeneity in all relevant country-specific models.
Table 3: Summary of EDH testing
(I) (II) (III)
Country CEE Dependence Euro Independence Global Independence
Bulgaria ‡ † †
Czech Rep. † † †
Estonia † † †
Hungary – – –
Latvia † † †
Lithuania † † †
Poland † † †
Romania † † †
‡ indicates significance at the 10% level; † at the 5% level
Table 3 summarises the empirical results. Overall, we seem to have established
strong evidence for the notion of Euro Dominance in the enlarging euro area. With
14Excluding Hungary improves the stability of the subsequent GVAR analysis. This allows us
to model all countries symmetrically despite the relatively small number of countries included and
despite the juxtaposition of small with large economies.
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the exception of Hungary, domestic CEE money markets are dominated by the euro
area over the long run which follows from conditions (I) and (II). The EDH seems
to hold in the strong form in the sense that euro rates are weakly exogenous. We
also find that dollar rates move independently from the eurozone. US interest rates
thus affect CEE countries only via the euro area which confirms condition (III) of
Global Independence.
3.3 Impulse response analysis
Figure 2: GIRF to country-specific shock
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The solid lines plot the country-specific point estimates; the dashed lines show the 95%
confidence intervals which are based on a sieve bootstrap using 5,000 replications.
Any investigation of financial linkages is of little meaning without analysing the
transmission of shocks. Based on the empirical evidence for Euro Independence and
Global Independence we shock foreign interest rates in the country-specific models
and estimate Generalised Impulse Response Functions (GIRFs). We distinguish
between the impulse responses arising from an EMU shock on CEE interest rates
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and a ROW shock on EMU interest rates. Both shocks are scaled appropriately
to correspond to a rise by one standard deviation of the error variance on impact.
Graphical output is summarised in figure 2. The panel in the far lower right corner
shows the eurozone impulse response function. The solid lines plot the country-
specific point estimates; the dashed lines represent the 95% confidence intervals
which are based on a sieve bootstrap using 5,000 replications.
The figure illustrates the varying speeds of adjustments of the error-correcting
relations over a period of 2 years. The analysis reveals that the impact on interest
rates dies out fairly quickly for countries with a tight exchange rate regime (see table
1). Bulgaria’s response is fairly persistent which may also be due to its compara-
tively late introduction of the unilateral CBA (also see the corresponding panel in
figure A.1).15 Romanian markets react quite strongly on impact but mean-reverting
behaviour is apparent. The reverting pattern seems more sluggish for inflation-
targeting countries, considering the Polish response to the EMU shock or the EMU
response to the ROW shock, respectively.
4 Economic and financial globalisation and the EDH
The GVAR model allows for the aggregation of foreign variables to investigate the
transmission of shocks on a regional and global level. This appears particularly rel-
evant given the by now large consensus among academics and policymakers that the
financial and economic globalisation and market integration also demand for more
policy coordination on the supranational level. The current financial and economic
crisis constitutes an obvious reminder of that need. We analyse in this section to
what extent the evidence on Euro Dominance is affected by such global shocks,
providing some preliminary insights on the impact of the recent financial crisis.
Given our particular interest in the efforts of CEE countries to integrate with
EMU we may think of domestic CEE money markets as being driven by a weighted
average of foreign rates, i.e. other CEE money markets but also EMU and the US.
We refer to them jointly as R∗it to indicate the conjectured linkages across markets.
Foreign interest rates for each CEE country are constructed using country-specific
weights
R∗it =
N∑
j=0
wijRjt,
where wij is the weight for CEE country i with respect to country j and wii = 0. We
experimented with different weighting methods such as simple equal weighting (to
reflect the overall converging pattern) or exchange rate weights based on purchasing
power parities (the conventional way). The empirical findings established previously
seem robust and carry over to the analysis here. We therefore keep on excluding the
Hungarian model and index the remaining series from 1, . . . , n− 1.
15This and the fact that Bulgaria did not join the EU until 2007 (compared to the first enlargement
phase of 2004) may also explain the somewhat weaker evidence for CEE Dependence in Bulgaria.
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We again stack domestic and (now weighted) foreign country-specific variables
in the vector zit and introduce the matrixWi which is defined by the country-specific
weights. This weighting matrix simply links all domestic models and is needed to
solve the GVAR. It can therefore accommodate various weights as long as they are
predetermined. Moreover, the analysis is invariant to the ordering of the countries.
Stacking all endogenous variables in Rt we can write
zit = WiRt i = 1, . . . , n− 1. (5)
Using (5) allows us to rewrite (2)
Ai(L, p)WiRt = ϕit, i = 1, . . . , n− 1, (6)
where
ϕit = ai0 + ai1t+ εit.
We retain the lag structure of the previously specified country models and stack
them together to obtain the GV AR(p):
G(L, p)Rt = ϕt, (7)
where
G(L, p) =
 A1(L, p)W1...
An−1(L, p)Wn−1

and
ϕt =
 ϕ1t...
ϕ(n−1)t
 .
We can solve (7) for all endogenous CEE interest rates simultaneously which
allows us to analyse impulse responses across the entire information set. We may
think of the GV AR(p) in this context as a regional model of CEE money markets
because it links this bloc of countries with both EMU and the ROW, while at the
same time allowing for the existence of linkages across CEE economies. The presence
of a solution to this system indirectly also provides evidence against the notion of
“CEE insularity”.
The impulse response analysis so far has implicitly assumed that shocks are not
global, i.e. they originate from a particular country or region. While this holds by
definition for intra-EU shocks, the financial crisis has demonstrated that there are
also shocks that cannot so easily be attributed to a particular country or region.
This is in particular due to the strong interconnectedness and global character of the
financial market place. We therefore construct a “global” shock which is a weighted
average of variable-specific shocks and as such common to all CEE countries in the
model.16
16See Pesaran et al. (2004) for further technical details and other applications of this procedure.
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Figure 3: GIRF to global shock
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Figure 3 summarises the estimated GIRFs to a one standard error global shock in
CEE. The effects through time are qualitatively rather similar to the previous impulse
responses to EMU shocks. This finding confirms the predominant role of the euro
area in the setting of CEE monetary policies and thus provides further support for
the validity of the EDH. It appears one cannot necessarily claim that the occurence
of global shocks matters for the process of European monetary integration. It rather
seems to be the case that domestic E(M)U events drive the adjustment towards a
long-run equilibrium or at least that global shocks are largely “absorbed” by the
eurozone and from there transmitted further.
5 Concluding remarks
We upgrade in this paper the so-called GDH in two dimensions. First, whereas the
earlier literature on the GDH modelled interest rate linkages and causality issues
within the former EMS, we reformulate the GDH for the CEE countries vis-a`-vis the
eurozone. We seek to answer whether the monetary policy implemented by the ECB
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dictates CEE monetary policies. Evidence for this EDH has important implications
for the process of European monetary integration as all these countries have com-
mitted themselves to eventually introduce the euro and to join the monetary union
with a single central bank. Second, we employ the relatively novel methodology of
GVAR modelling to investigate convergence and the transmission of external shocks.
Unlike the traditional approaches of testing the GDH that are either bivariate
in nature are expressed in terms of high dimensional VECMs, the proposed GVAR
model generalises multivariate cointegration analysis to allow for weakly exogenous,
structural I(1) variables. This methodology is hence particularly suitable for small
open economies. It deals first with error-correcting terms on the country level which
allows for richer dynamics and more efficient estimation. One can stack this infor-
mation in a second step into a global (multi-country) system that can be used to
investigate impulse response functions on a “global” level. The proposed approach
may hence be considered a consolidation of previous testing procedures.
The EDH is tested as a set of three complementary hypotheses: CEE Depen-
dence, Euro Independence and Global Independence. Our empirical results strongly
support the EDH. We find that there is evidence for the notion of Euro Dominance,
i.e. CEE Depedence together with Euro Independence, across CEE countries. Do-
mestic CEE policies seem to follow the ECB’s monetary policy stance (proxied by
money market rates) quite closely irrespective of the prevailing exchange rate ar-
rangement. Country-specific impulse response functions suggest that countries with
relatively tight monetary regimes react more strongly to EMU shocks. We reject the
EDH for Hungary which may reflect domestic policies dominating over EMU ones.
The fact that our procedure reveals differences across economies shows that it has
power.
European monetary integration is best understood as an ongoing long-term pro-
cess. The non-rejection of the EDH is somewhat surprising, given the recent financial
turmoil. One may expect that central banks in CEE find it increasingly difficult in
the near future to mimic the ECB’s policies and to maintain the path of monetary
convergence with the euro area. In particular, trying to keep exchange rates, interest
rates and inflation rates within the Maastricht ranges on a sustainable basis may be-
come ever more challenging. On the other hand, if the evidence on Euro Dominance
was true, CEE central bankers would not lose an independent monetary policy stance
through joining EMU but are likely to gain influence in the ECB’s common mon-
etary policy decisions. Our analysis suggests that inner E(M)U events rather than
external shocks will determine the future of the enlarging eurozone, which speaks in
favour of an already advanced state of monetary integration in Europe.
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A Figures
Figure A.1: Euro exchange rates in terms of domestic CEE currency
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Source: ECB. The data are monthly averages; the old Romanian lei was replaced by the
leu on 1 July 2005
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Figure A.2: Levels of individual series
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Figure A.3: First differences of individual series
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B Tables
Table B.1: ADF test results
p=0 p=1 p=2 p=3
1st differences
euro area -4.38a -4.35 -3.52 -3.88
Bulgaria -11.20 -7.76 -5.84 -6.68a
Czech Rep. -5.93a -5.50 -4.44 -3.87
Estonia -8.59a -7.10 -4.94 -4.15
Hungary -8.46a -7.35 -5.85 -5.10
Latvia -8.85 -8.29 -6.87 -6.97a
Lithuania -8.12 -10.88a -8.09 -6.78
Poland -5.04a -4.18 -3.07 -3.02
Romania -7.81a -7.78 -6.77 -5.11
US -7.46 -5.16a -4.45 -3.58
Levels
euro area 0.27 -1.78a -1.62 -2.05
Bulgaria -1.81a -1.79 -1.69 -1.79
Czech Rep. -1.35 -1.59a -1.53 -1.61
Estonia -0.64 -0.91a -0.83 -1.06
Hungary -2.41 -2.53a -2.24 -2.32
Latvia -1.52 -2.11 -0.81a -0.61
Lithuania -4.56 -2.29 -1.47a -1.46
Poland -2.08 -2.18 -2.48 -2.27a
Romania -3.89 -4.60a -2.32 -1.48
US -0.73 -1.15a -1.42 -1.52
ADF test statistics for the levels are computed with an intercept. The 5% critical values
are -1.94 for the first differences and -2.89 for the levels. Tests are conducted for differ-
ent lag lengths p with a maximum order of three, where the a in superscript denotes the
order of augmentation chosen in the Dickey-Fuller regressions according to the AIC.
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Table B.2: Cointegration rank statistics
trace critical values
Country H0 HA statistic 95% 90%
Bulgaria r=0 r=1 11.14 12.53 10.69
Czech Rep. r=0 r=1 20.93 12.53 10.69
Estonia r=0 r=1 14.86 12.75 10.79
Hungary r=0 r=1 5.19 12.75 10.79
Latvia r=0 r=1 16.83 12.75 10.79
Lithuania r=0 r=1 27.20 12.75 10.79
Poland r=0 r=1 19.56 12.53 10.69
Romania r=0 r=1 27.07 12.75 10.79
euro area r=0 r=1 16.93 12.80 10.82
Critical values are simulated using 10,000 replications.
Table B.3: Weak exogeneity test results
Country t-statistic p-value
Bulgaria 0.44 0.66
Czech Rep. 0.66 0.51
Estonia 0.01 0.99
Hungary – –
Latvia 0.04 0.96
Lithuania -0.03 0.97
Poland 0.50 0.62
Romania 1.54 0.13
euro area -0.81 0.42
Hungary not included in the testing procedure due to lack of evidence for cointegration.
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